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JURISDICTION

This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide cross-

appellants' appeal pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(3)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL

1.

Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to apply the doctrine of practical

construction in its interpretation of the Combined Agreement, when faced with the
absence of the identification in the Combined Agreement, itself, as to whom
commission payments were intended to be made?
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT
50 1J16, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140.
2.

Issue: Is the trial court's finding no. 23, that the commission payments

under the Combined Agreement were intended to be paid 50% to PCG and 50% to
appellant, rather than 100% to appellant, supported by substantial evidence?
Standard of Review: A trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. Washington County Water Conservancy District v. Morgan,
2003 UT 58 ^ 2 3 , 8 2 P.3d 1125, 1132.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(b): Defenses and objections. How presented.
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of

1

the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making
any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a
responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(h). Waiver of Defenses.
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by
motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of
failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to
state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the
pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial,
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any
evidence that may have been received.

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 17(a). Parties plaintiff and defendant. Real party in interest.
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by
statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so
provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be
2

brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if
the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in
interest.
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 25(c). Substitution of parties. Transfer of interest.
Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action
may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court
upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred
to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.
Service of the motion shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a)
of this rule.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This case arises out of a contract to sell a physicians' billing service, Physician's
Control Group, Inc. ("PCG") by Cross-Appellant and Appellee David L. Orlob ("Orlob"),
to Appellants and Cross-Appellees Wasatch Management ("Wasatch"), Kenneth C.
Jensen ("Ken"), Earlene B. Jensen ("Earlene"), Steven K. Jensen ("Steve"), and Keven
J. Jensen ("Keven"), (collectively the "Jensens). The Jensens did not want to assume
any of the outstanding liabilities of PCG, so they refused to purchase the stock in PCG,
of which Orlob was the sole owner, and instead structured an asset purchase.
Compensation to Orlob for the asset purchase was designed, as is common for such
transactions to avoid double taxation, to be paid in the form of monthly commissions,
for about five years, in exchange for Orlob assisting with the transfer of the business to
the Jensens and for Orlob providing a covenant not to compete with the Jensens for ten
years.
3

To effectuate this plan, PCG, Orlob, individually, Wasatch, and Ken, Earlene,
Steve and Keven, individually, each executed an agreement entitled the "Combined
Agreement." The Jensens commenced making the monthly commission payments
under the Combined Agreement directly to Orlob, individually. Differences arose
surrounding Orlob's advice to the Jensens on how to protect the goodwill and contract
pricing of PCG, and disputes arose between Orlob and the Jensens, including a
claimed breach by Orlob of the covenant not to compete, with both parties claiming the
other had breached. PCG, which received no commission payments under the
Combined Agreement, and had no bank account, employees or business, was allowed
by Orlob to be administratively dissolved by the state. The Jensens continued to make
commission payments to Orlob under the Combined Agreement, with certain
adjustments they claimed made them whole for Orlob's alleged breaches, however,
until the Internal Revenue Service placed a lien on PCG's interest in the Combined
Agreement, and sold that interest to the Jensens. At that point, the Jensens ceased
making commission payments to Orlob, and Orlob sued to recover the commission
payments that represented the remaining consideration for his sale of his physician's
billing service.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

On November 6, 2000, the trial court granted a final judgment, on summary
judgment against Orlob, ruling that he had no individual interest under the Combined
Agreement and dismissing the Jensens counterclaims by stipulation, without prejudice
to renewing them after appeal if the case came back. Orlob filed with the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on
4

November 14, 2000. The case was poured over by the Utah Supreme Court to this
Court for decision.
On October 4, 2001, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding,
on summary judgment, that Orlob had no individual interest under the Combined
Agreement, in Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 2001 UT App. 287, 33 P.3d 1078
("Orlob /"). This Court reversed, as follows:
The parties attached greater value to the covenants to assist in the
transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to compete.
Without these covenants, whatever good will and reputation being
transferred could be undermined by competition from either Orlob
or PCG. The parties agreed that the covenants of the Combined
Agreement were worth more than $500,000 during its term.
Without Orlob's personal covenants and promises, and
personal assistance and involvement, the agreement would
have little value. Thus, we conclude that Orlob has an individual
interest in the Combined Agreement, which is tied to his covenants
to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to
compete.
fl 20 We conclude the Combined Agreement unambiguously
includes Orlob, individually, as a party. Further, he has an
individual interest in the Combined Agreement separate and
distinct from PCG's interest. His interest arises from the personal
covenants he made to assist with the orderly transfer and
maintenance of accounts and not to compete with Wasatch and
the Jensens. [FN3]
FN3. We do not address what percentages of interest Orlob and
PCG had in the Combined Agreement, nor do we address whether
Orlob breached the Combined Agreement.
fl 21 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of Wasatch
and the Jensen's motion for summary judgment. We reverse the
district court's denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary
judgment. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Id. ffll 19-21, 33 P.3d at 1082 (emphasis supplied).

5

On remand, the trial court held a trial on June 25, 26 and 27, 2002. Prior to
entering its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the Jensens filed a posttrial brief, raising new defenses for the first time. Orlob moved to strike such brief and,
after hearing on the motion to strike, the trial court struck the Jensen's post-trial brief,
took arguments on whether pre-judgment interest was awardable, and entered its
finding of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, on February 10, 2004. A timely notice
of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, was filed by the Jensens with the Third District
Court, on March 9, 2004 and a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was
filed by Orlob with the Third District Court on March 10, 2004. Both appeals were
poured over to this Court for decision and this Court consolidated the appeals, and
designated the Jensens as Appellants and Cross-Appellees, and Orlob as CrossAppellant and Appellee.
C.

Disposition By Trial Court.

The trial court entered its final judgment on February 10, 2004, awarding Orlob
damages in the sum of $340,162.10.
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT1

1.

Plaintiff David L. Orlob ("Orlob"), in approximately 1978, started a

physicians billing service known as Professional's Control Group. R. 1632.
2.

In December, 1984, Orlob incorporated Professional's Control Group as

Professional's Control Group, Inc., a Utah corporation ("PCG"). R. 1632.
3.

Defendant Wasatch Medical Management was, at all material times, a

1

The following facts are taken from the like-numbered paragraphs in the trial
court's findings of fact. R. 1631-49.
6

partnership consisting of defendants Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K.
Jensen and Kevin J. Jensen (collectively, the "Jensens"). Prior to August 1, 1988, the
Jensens operated a physician's billing service primarily in the Ogden area. R. 1632.
4.

During 1987 and the first part of 1988, the Jensens desired to enter the

Salt Lake valley market to provide physician billing services. During that time, PCG
provided service to between 30% and 35% of the anesthesiology market in the Salt
Lake valley, as well as some physicians in Logan and some physicians in Payson,
Utah. R. 1632.
5.

At that time, PCG provided those billing services to physicians at the rate

of 6% of collections. R. 1632.
6.

When the Jensens attempted to enter the Salt Lake market, they

contacted a variety of anesthesiologists, some of whom were clients of PCG, and
offered billing services at 4%. Up until that time, the market for billing services had
been relatively stable and PCG had not received complaints about its price for billing
services. R. 1633.
7.

The Jensens' efforts led at least three of PCG's clients to leave PCG. R.

8.

Orlob approached the Jensens, advised them that he was interested in

1633.

selling PCG and leaving the Salt Lake City area, and inquired into their interest in
purchasing PCG. The Jensens were adamant that they were not interested in
purchasing the stock of PCG, because they did not want to assume any outstanding
liabilities of that existing corporate entity. R. 1633.
9.

After negotiations, the parties agreed to a purchase and sale and
7

memorialized that agreement in a document titled "Combined Agreement," executed
August 31, 1988 by the parties, and effective as of August 1, 1988 (the "Combined
Agreement"). R. 1633.
10.

The Combined Agreement states: "For Orlob's assistance in the transfer

and maintenance of accounts listed on Schedule 'B' Jensens shall pay to Orlob a
commission that has been calculated at $7,500 per month." Combined Agreement, fl 8.
R. 1633.
11.

The Combined Agreement also states: "Orlob further agrees and warrants

he will not compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Jensens in the
billing and collection business for a period of ten years commencing August 1, 1988."
Combined Agreement, Tf 6. R. 1633-34.
12.

"Orlob has an individual interest in the combined agreement, which is tied

to his covenants to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to
compete." Orlob /, 2001 UT App. 287, U 19. R. 1634.
13.

At the time the Combined Agreement was executed, all of the physicians

listed in Schedule "B" to the Combined Agreement were under contract with PCG to pay
6% of total collections for services rendered. However, William M. Hamilton, M.D., one
of the physicians on that list, had sent a letter, dated August 10, 1988, to Orlob and
PCG providing notice of his termination of his contract as of December 1, 1988. All of
the doctors listed on Schedule "B" were on contracts that allowed termination upon
either 30 or 90 days' written notice. R. 1634.
14.

After execution of the Combined Agreement, Orlob advised PCG's

employees that they would become employees of the Jensens. Orlob even specifically
8

dissuaded at least on valuable employee, who expressed an intention to terminate her
employment when she learned the Jensens would be purchasing the company, from
leaving. That employee remains with the Jensens to this day and has been a valuable
asset to them, including training new employees. Orlob also took all necessary steps to
place PCG's checking account under the Jensens' control and to transfer all files of
PCG to the Jensens' control. Steven Jensen prepared a form 1099 to David L. Orlob
for commission payments made in 1989. R. 1634.
15.

The Jensens repeatedly requested that Orlob introduce them to

physicians as the new owners of the company. Orlob refused to do so, advising the
Jensens that if doctors who previously had been offered billing at 4% by the Jensens
learned that the Jensens were the new owners of the company, it would affect their
willingness to continue on their contracts to pay 6%. The Jensens then advised at least
one such doctor that they were the new owners of the company, which created the very
reaction Orlob predicted, with the Salt Lake anesthesiologists threatening to terminate
their contracts. Thereupon, the Jensens chose to negotiate reductions in the billing
rates for those doctors from 6% to 5%. From that time forward, the relationship
between the Jensens and David L. Orlob deteriorated, with each periodically
threatening litigation against the other. R. 1635.
16.

The only evidence of Dr. Hamilton's average income per month is Exhibit

5, which was prepared by the Jensens, showing an average income per month for 1988
of $18,044.00. Because Dr. Hamilton had already sent a letter terminating his 6%
contract at the time the Combined Agreement was executed, Orlob breached his
warranty with respect to Dr. Hamilton. Ultimately, Dr. Hamilton did not terminate as his

9

letter stated he would, based upon the efforts of the Jensens to renegotiate his
contract. According to Exhibit 3, which was prepared by the Jensens, there were no
reductions for Dr. Hamilton until May, 1989, at which time Dr. Hamilton went from 6% to
5%. 1 % of $18,044.00 per month is $180.44 per month. As of May, 1989, when Dr.
Hamilton went from 6% to 5%, a reduction in the $7,500.00 per month Orlob
commission of $180.44 per month is appropriate to remedy the breach of warranty for
Dr. Hamilton. R. 1635-36.
17.

In or about February, 1990, according to Exhibit 9, Dr. Watson in Payson

telephoned the Jensens and advised them that he would be switching his billing
agencies, not in any way related to any performance problems but, instead, because of
personal disagreements with Dr. Beaty which necessitated a restructuring of their
organization. The Jensens took it upon themselves to negotiate with Dr. Watson and
Dr. Beaty to form an employee leasing company and to reduce the amount at which
they were willing to provide billing services to Dr. Beaty and Dr. Watson from 6% to 4%.
Such circumstances are unrelated to any breach of the Combined Agreement by Orlob,
R. 1636.
18.

With respect to the physicians listed on Schedule "B" of the Combined

Agreement who terminated, and replacement doctors:
a.

Dr. Stockham terminated as of October, 1989, and, beginning with

that date, a reduction in the Orlob commission of $210.54 is appropriate. Dr.
Stockham testified that he returned after six months, however, and, therefore, no
reduction is appropriate for Dr. Stockham after March of 1990. R. 1636.
b.

Dr. Crookston departed as of October, 1989, and a reduction of
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$370.71 per month for Dr. Crookston is appropriate under the Combined
Agreement. Dr. Christensen replaced Dr. Crookston in March, 1990, such that no
reductions for Dr. Crookston are appropriate after February, 1990. R. 1636-37.
c.

Dr. Peterson departed as of November, 1989, and that a reduction

of $396.64 per month in the Orlob commission is appropriate from and after
November, 1989. R. 1637.
d.

Dr. Decker departed as of October, 1990, and that a reduction of

$260.44 per month in the Orlob commission is appropriate from and after
October, 1990. R. 1637.
e.

As of January, 1991, and thereafter, there were enough

replacement physicians that, from and after January, 1991, there could be no
allowed reductions to the Orlob commission payment under the Combined
Agreement. R. 1637.
19.

Dr. Peterson departed from the Jensens services to have his billing

performed by Tracey Hall, now known as Tracey Kartsone. Ms. Kartsone utilized
equipment belonging to Mr. Orlob's new company, leased some space from Mr. Orlob
and received consulting services from Orlob in conjunction with the billing services she
provided to Dr. Peterson. Ms. Kartsone paid Mr. Orlob some sum of money for leasing
and consulting, although the precise sum is in dispute. However, the precise sum is
immaterial, because Orlob's knowledge of and assistance to Ms. Kartsone, and receipt
of funds from her, established her as an agency for competition with the Jensens with
respect to Dr. Peterson. As such, Orlob breached his personal covenant not to
compete directly or indirectly with respect to Dr. Peterson. R. 1637-38.
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20.

On January 25, 1990, the Jensens issued a letter to Orlob stating that

they were going to commence reducing the commission payment by $801.93, which
they calculated as their monthly net profit from Dr. Peterson. The Jensens in fact made
that deduction from the Orlob commission payment from that date forward and the
Court finds that such resolution elected by the Jensens as the remedy for such breach
was fair and appropriate. R. 1638.
21.

On or about October 1, 1990, the United States Department of the

Treasury, Internal Revenue Service served a notice of levy upon the Jensens
concerning taxes owing by PCG. The Jensens made no payment to Orlob, individually,
for the commission payment due October 25, 1990, and no payment to Orlob,
individually, thereafter. R. 1638.
22.

The Internal Revenue Service held a public auction on December 10,

1990, at which it sold only the right, title and interest of PCG in and to the Combined
Agreement. The Jensens were the successful bidder at that auction and purchased the
PCG interest in the Combined Agreement. There was no levy upon any individual
interest of David L. Orlob, at any time, by the Internal Revenue Service, nor did the
public auction result in the sale of any of the interest of David L Orlob, individually, in
the Combined Agreement. R. 1638.
23.

The Combined Agreement, itself, does not state whether or how the

commission payment should be divided between PCG and David L. Orlob, individually.
Absent any instruction in the Combined Agreement, the Court found that the
commission payments go one-half, or 50%, to PCG and one-half, or 50%, to Orlob,
individually. R. 1639.
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24.

The Schedule of Commission Payments attached to the Court's Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit A accurately reflects those commissions
payable and paid, or portions paid or otherwise credited, such that the amounts owing,
with interest, to Orlob for his 50% in the Combined Agreement would be the total shown
on Exhibit A attached to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or in other words,
the sum of $340,162.10. R. 1639.
ADDITIONAL FACTS

25.

Every commission check was written, on its face, to David L. Orlob,

individually, and not to PCG. See Exhibit 47, Checks (admitted R. 1682, Tr. 28:2029:10).
26.

The Jensens issued an IRS form 1099 for commission payments to Orlob,

individually, but not to PCG. R. 1685, Deposition Testimony of Steven K. Jensen, Tr.
37:4-39-15.
27.

In all their correspondence to Orlob while the commission payments were

being made, the Jensen's refer to them as Orlob's commission or "your" commission
when the letter was addressed to Orlob. See Exhibits 7, 8, 9 and 32.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

At trial, no evidence was adduced to show that any of the funds paid under the
terms of the Combined Agreement were paid to PCG. The only evidence presented
was to the contrary. The parties to the Combined Agreement always treated the
amounts owed under the Combined Agreement as amounts owed to Orlob; specifically,
all checks issued were issued to Orlob, PCG had been administratively dissolved by the
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State of Utah, was defunct for all intents and purposes. There is simply no evidence
from which the trial court could have concluded that half of the amounts owing under
the Combined Agreement belonged to PCG.

ARGUMENT
I.

RULES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO APPLY THE
DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION TO DETERMINE W H O WAS ENTITLED TO
RECEIVE THE COMMISSION PAYMENTS UNDER THE COMBINED AGREEMENT.

The trial court, in Finding of Fact No.23, stated: 'The Combined Agreement,
itself, does not state whether or how the commission payment should be divided
between PCG and David L. Orlob, individually. Absent any instruction in the Combined
Agreement, the Court found that the commission payments go one-half, or 50%, to
PCG and one-half, or 50%, to Orlob, individually." This finding of fact was entered
contrary to established rules of contract construction that must guide a court when a
written instrument itself is ambiguously silent on the very issue that was before the trial
court, namely, who is entitled to the monthly commission payments?
The general rule of contract construction applicable in this case is the doctrine of
practical construction, long recognized as capable of answering such questions by
looking at the conduct of the parties, themselves, in discharging their contractual
obligations:
In the determination of the meaning of an indefinite or ambiguous
contract, the construction placed upon the contract by the parties
themselves is to be considered by the court. The practical
construction or uniform conduct or practice of the parties under a
contract is a consideration of much importance in ascertaining its
meaning, and that consideration is entitled to great, if not
controlling, weight in ascertaining the parties' understanding of the

14

contract terms and language, since the parties are in the best
position to know what was intended by the language employed.
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts, § 354 (1991)(footnotes omitted). This general principle is
mirrored in the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 202 (1981):

Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance
and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given
great weight in the interpretation of the agreement.
Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties
to a promise or agreement are interpreted as consistent with each
other and with any relevant course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade.
Id. § 202(4)-(5).
The Utah courts long ago adopted the doctrine of practical construction under
circumstances where the contract language itself is not plain. The Utah Supreme Court
has stated: "When the parties to a contract perform under it and demonstrate by their
conduct that they knew what they were talking about the courts should enforce their
interest." Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (1965) (quoting
Crestview Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 54 Cal.2d 744, 8 Cal.Rptr. 427, 356 P.2d 171
(1960)). Accord Eie v. St Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (1981) (enforcing
agreement in accordance with parties' conduct); Upland Industries Corp. v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1984) (court will enforce agreement in
light of two and one half years of conduct of parties).
In this case, the facts supporting a practical construction that Orlob, not PCG,
was the intended recipient of the commission payments are compelling, yet were not
used by the trial court to resolve its stated dilemma. First, this was intended to be, and
15

was, the sale of a business that Orlob had created and operated over the years, in part
due to Orlob's desire to relocate at a point in the near future. See FOF fflj 1-8; R. 163233. The only reason that the sale was not a stock sale was to accommodate the
Jensen's desire not to assume PCG liabilities. See FOF fl 8; R. 1633. The bulk of the
value in the Combined Agreement was contained in Orlob's personal covenants to
assist in the orderly transfer of the business and his ten year non-compete agreement.
See FOF ffl] 10-12; R. 1633-34; and Orlob /, 2001 UT App. 287 ffl| 19-21, 33 P.3d at
1082.
The Jensens submitted an IRS form 1099 to the IRS reporting commission
payments to Orlob, personally, not to PCG. Every check written by the Jensens for
commission payments was written to Orlob, personally, not to PCG. See Exhibit 47.
The Jensens' correspondence reflects that they considered the commission payments
to be "Orlob's." See Exhibits 7, 8, 9 and 32. PCG had no bank account in which to
place any payments, PCG was entirely defunct and allowed to be administratively
dissolved by the State of Utah. See Exhibit 40, R. 1681, Tr. 81:5-82:6.
Rules of contract interpretation are applied as a matter of law. The doctrine of
practical construction should have been used as the respected rule of contract
interpretation it is, to resolve the trial court's expressed dilemma over the absence of
express contract language. All the evidence of the conduct of the parties established
that the commission payments were made by the Jensens to Orlob, the only contracting
party in a position to receive them, and the doctrine of practical construction therefore
would not allow for the arbitrary reduction of Orlob's judgment by 50%, for unpaid
commission payments. This Court should reverse the arbitrary reduction of Orlob's
16

right to receive the commission payments by 50%, and apply the legal tool of the
doctrine of practical construction to award all of the commission payments to Orlob, and
none to PCG.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT REDUCING ORLOB'S JUDGMENT BY 50%

Is

NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

As was shown in Point I, above, the trial court, in Finding of Fact No. 23,
effectively conceded that it had no basis in fact to allocate 50% of the commission
payments to PCG. Indeed, the Jensens themselves concede that no evidence exists in
the record to allocate 50% of the commission payments to PCG, although they attempt
to characterize the failure as being that no evidence supports Orlob getting 50%. See
Appellants' Brief at 49 ("In this case, however, the Defendants have located no
evidence in the record whatsoever supporting the District Court's finding. There is,
literally, no evidence to marshall.") The Jensens are correct insofar as they concede
that not one whit of evidence supports any portion of the commission payments under
the Combined Agreement being allocated to PCG. There is, therefore, nothing to
marshall on that front.
Defendants have, however, utterly failed to marshall the evidence supporting the
trial court's finding that Orlob is entitled to receive commission payments, some of
which evidence is set forth above in Point I on the doctrine of practical construction.
Since all of the evidence supporting a practical construction shows Orlob receiving the
commission payments, and not PCG, and there is no evidence that PCG was to receive
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any commission payments,2 the trial court's finding that takes away 50% of the
commission payments from Orlob and gives it to PCG is clearly erroneous and is not
supported by substantial evidence. The judgment entered should be ordered to be
doubled, because all the evidence shows that Orlob, not PCG, was entitled to receive,
and in fact received, the commission payments.
APPELLEE'S BRIEF

ARGUMENT
III.

THE JENSENS' UNTIMELY DEFENSE BASED ON ORLOB'S BANKRUPTCY WAS
CONSIDERED FULLY AND PROPERLY REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

The Jensens sought to raise their "standing" (actually real party in interest)
defense for the first time, after more than eight years, after the conclusion of one
appeal to this Court, and after trial on the merits on remand, by way of a post-trial
memorandum. R. 1484-99. Orlob moved to strike the memorandum and defenses it
purported to raise. R. 1503-26. The trial court ruled in Orlob's favor, struck the
memorandum and entered judgment in Orlob's favor, finding that the defenses sought
were waivable and had been waived.

2

Nor is there any rational reason offered as to why Orlob might subject the
payments to the double taxation they would receive if they were made to PCG.
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A.

THE JENSENS WAIVED THEIR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST DEFENSE, THAT THEY
SEEK TO PURSUE BY MISLABELING IT AS A "STANDING" DEFENSE,3 BY NOT
RAISING IT UNTIL AFTER TRIAL AND ALMOST TEN YEARS AFTER THEY
ANSWERED.

The Jensens' novel effort to raise, for the first time in ten years of litigation, and
entirely post-trial, a defense based on Orlob's post-complaint bankruptcy filing is
unsupported in the evidence, was found by the trial court to be waivable, and was
stricken by the trial court as untimely raised.
The Jensens' revisionist history on this issue is palpable. The Jensens argue
that the evidence at trial showed, although the trial court failed to find, that Orlob's filing
of a bankruptcy after he filed this action, without listing this action as an asset on his
bankruptcy schedules, amounts to "concealment" and that the bankruptcy trustee's
acquisition of legal title to the claim prohibits Orlob from pursuing it.
In their memorandum opposing Orlob's motion to strike the Jensens' untimely
new defenses raised in their post-trial memorandum, the Jensens argued: 'The reason
that no relief may be granted in this case is that the Defendant violated his duty of
disclosure on the bankruptcy schedules he filed in California!,]" Opp Mem at 3; R. 1539.
When the Jensens argued the proffered relevancy of the bankruptcy schedules, in
opposition to Orlob's motion in limine and prior to the commencement of trial, however,
they asserted an entirely different theory of relevancy. In "Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Re: Bankruptcy Schedule," dated May 28, 2002 (R. 140104), the Jensens did not argue about any "duty of disclosure" but instead represented

3

The law demonstrating that the Jensens' defense is a real party in interest
defense, and not jurisdictional, is discussed below, in Part C.
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to the trial court that the bankruptcy schedules would be offered by the Jensens "only to
show that [Orlob's] view of the value of his interest in the Agreement was that it had no
value. [Emphasis in original.]" Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re:
Bankruptcy Schedule, dated May 28, 2002, at 3, R. 1403. In keeping with that very
limited scope for which the bankruptcy schedule was offered, the Jensens' trial
memorandum, dated June 20, 2002,4 contained none of the arguments concerning
"standing" (in reality, real-party-in-interest) or judicial estoppel that the Jensens asserted
for the first time in their supplemental post-trial memorandum. Instead, the Jensens'
trial memorandum argued that the bankruptcy schedule showed "By [Orlob's] own
admission, his interest in the Combined Agreement had little or no value" Defendants'
trial memorandum, dated June 20, 2002, at 9 (Appendix 1) (emphasis added). The
bankruptcy schedules were offered at trial for that limited purpose and received by the
trial court strictly for that limited purpose.
At no time in the ten years prior to trial did the Jensens ever raise the real party
in interest defense that they unsuccessfully urged upon the trial court post-trial. This is
true despite multiple opportunities to do so. The Jensens did not raise the defense in
their answer. R. 62-67.
A decade earlier, the Jensens argued the merits of the case fully in their
memorandum in opposition to Orlob's motion for summary judgment and in support of a
cross-motion for summary judgment, filed on or about December 6, 1993. R. 194-

4

Defendants' Trial Memorandum is not listed on the record index. A datestamped copy is contained within the records of Orlob's counsel and is attached hereto
as Appendix 1.
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220A. However carefully the Court may scrutinize that memorandum, it will find no
mention of any "duty to disclose" or, for that matter, any mention of bankruptcy
whatsoever, despite the fact that, throughout that memorandum, the Jensens sought to
defeat Orlob's claims. Nor is there any mention of bankruptcy or a "duty to disclose" in
the April 18, 1994 trial memorandum filed by the Jensens. R. 328-343. Nor do those
defenses appear in the Jensens' memorandum in support of motion for partial summary
judgment [on Orlob's claims], dated September 7, 1999. R. 421-549. Nor do they
appear in the Jensens' response to Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment on
Orlob's claims, dated February 22, 2000. R. 701-705. Nor did the Jensens raise the
issue in their brief to the Utah Court of Appeals on the prior appeal, in which they
argued all their existing defenses against liability. Nor did the Jensens raise these
issues at any time during the course of the trial itself or during closing arguments, even
after the trial court invited supplementation of the issues the trial court desired to have
argued orally. R. 1683, Tr. 40:7-18.
Instead, it was only after trial, for the first time, that the Jensens raised this
concept of "duty to disclose" on the bankruptcy schedules for any defense of "standing"
which is really a real-party-in-interest defense,5 or "judicial estoppel." But no evidence
was received at trial on those issues, because the bankruptcy evidence was offered
and received for the narrow purpose of showing that Orlob himself did not believe that
the Combined Agreement had any value to him, an argument that the trial court

5

The Jensens in that post-trial memorandum also sought to raise for the first time
the defense of judicial estoppel, which effort was also rejected by the trial court.
Appendix 2.
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rejected by virtue of its findings. The case of Keller v. Southwood North Medical
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998), is therefore dispositive and the trial court
properly struck the defense as untimely and entered judgment.
B.

"STANDING TO S U E " AND "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST" ARE DISTINCT
CONCEPTS AND THE "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST"DEFENSE CAN BE, A N D HAS
BEEN, WAIVED.

The Jensens are aware that the trial court ruled that their late effort to raise new
defenses would not be allowed because their failure to raise the defenses timely
resulted in a waiver.

They therefore seek to mislabel their waived, real party in

interest defense, as a "standing" defense, because true "standing to sue" is
jurisdictional in nature, and cannot be waived.
Controlling Utah precedent and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establish that
this is not a jurisdictional issue of standing, but rather, one of a defect in parties or real
party in interest that defendants have waived.6 By asserting that it is the bankruptcy

6

The Jensens may hold out hope for success in their argument, perhaps,
because many courts make the mistake of confusing real party in interest issues as
"standing to sue," when they are not. See Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3531, at 341-45 & n. 8 (1984)
("At times courts are tempted to draw from standing decisions in addressing such
matters as the existence of a cause of action, identification of the real party in interest,
capacity, intervention, and even the procedural rights of bankrupts."). In Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bachman, 894 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained why it is important to distinguish
between the very different concepts of standing and real party in interest:
The term "standing," however, is used loosely in many contexts to
denote the party with a right to bring a particular cause of action.
This practice leads to much confusion when it is necessary to
distinguish between "standing" in its most technical sense and the
concept of real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). . . .
Using the term "standing" to designate real-party-in-interest issues
(continued...)
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trustee, rather than Orlob, who owns the cause of action in this case, the Jensens are
asserting that this action is not "prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
UTAH

R.

CIV.

P. 17(a). That defense is required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to

be asserted in a responsive pleading. Specifically,

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(b) states: "Every

defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if
one is required. . . ."

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(b). The Jensens filed such a responsive

pleading but failed to raise the defense that Orlob was not the real party in interest to
pursue this lawsuit in their answer, the Jensens waived the defense. See, e.g.,

UTAH

R.

CIV. P. 12(h).
In Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976), "[pjlaintiff sued to recover a sum
he claimed under an agreement with defendant." Id. at 496. The defendant was listed
as an individual, operating under an assumed name of Lynn S. Porter House Movers,
Inc. See id. The case proceeded through trial and a judgment was entered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant, individually. See id. The Utah Supreme Court

6

(...continued)
tempts courts to apply standing principles outside the context in
which they were developed. The instant case illustrates the
problems that can result. Defendants are correct that standing may
implicate the Article III requirement of a "case or controversy" and
issue of subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be waived.
However, failure to timely raise a real-party-in-interest defense
operates as a waiver. [Citations omitted.] Even if standing
jurisprudence is helpful by analogy in resolving real-party-ininterest issues, this does not convert real party in interest into
a non-waivable issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

Id. at 1235-36 (emphasis added).
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held than an individual defendant's failure to object to a defect in parties (claiming that a
corporate defendant should have been named rather than the individual) which was not
raised timely, was waived "as provided in Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P." Id. at 496. That case,
decided expressly under Rule 12(h), is in accord with the long-standing law in the state
of Utah.
In Smith v. Royer, 26 Utah 2d 83, 485 P.2d 664 (1971), the Court held that,
where the plaintiffs "standing as the real party in interest in the replevin action was not
raised below, . . . it was waived." 26 Utah 2d at 87, 485 P.2d at 666-67. Indeed, the
controlling law in Utah has been settled for over 100 years. In Fritz v. The Western
Union Telegraph Company, 25 Utah 263, 71 P. 209 (1903), the Utah Supreme Court
ruled that an objection made at trial on real party in interest grounds "was urged too
late, and must be held to have been waived." 25 Utah at 280, 71 P. at 214. This 100
year old law establishes that the real party in interest defense is not jurisdictionallybased, but rather it is waivable. The Lewis decision establishes that such rule remains
the same under

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 12(h). See Lewis, 556 P.2dat496.

Here, despite having knowledge of Orlob's bankruptcy filing for more than eight
years, the Jensens chose not to seek to amend their pleadings to assert a real party in
interest defense, but rather, to sit back and wait and make a strategic judgment to
assert such defense only after they might lose on their other defenses, attempting to
couch it in the guise of jurisdiction. The law that controls this defense does not allow
such gamesmanship. The trial court was correct to strike the supplemental trial
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memorandum purporting to raise the defense.7
C.

THE FEDERAL LAW CITED BY THE JENSENS DOES NOT STAND FOR THE
PROPOSITION THAT A "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST" DEFENSE Is
JURISDICTIONAL.

The Jensens desire to divert attention from the controlling Utah law, and to focus
on federal cases they contend support their entitlement to raise their defense, for the
first time, eight years after they filed their answer, and after trial concluded. The
Jensens rely primarily on the case of Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885 (9th
Cir. 1982), and its progeny, for the proposition that Orlob may not pursue his lawsuit
because it was not listed as an asset in his bankruptcy schedules.8 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the Steins, individually, "have no standing as creditors or
guarantors of Century," id. at 895, to assert Century's anti-trust claims that had not
been listed on its bankruptcy schedules. The rationale for that ruling was that the
"competitive injury" is to the corporation. See id. at 896. The issue of whether Stein
could pursue an antitrust claim as an assignee of Century, the bankrupt, was resolved
because Century did not own the claim to assign to Stein in the first place, the
bankruptcy trustee did. See id. at 889 ("The court held that Century's failure to list the
antitrust claim in the Chapter XI proceedings prevented the asset from vesting in

7

See also UTAH R. CIV. P. 25(c), authorizing a trial court to allow an original
plaintiff to continue an action even where its interest has been transferred.
8

It is important to note that, in Stein, the debtor had filed for bankruptcy on
October 11, 1976, see id. at 888, prior to the anti-trust case being filed in June, 1979,
see id. at 889. The plaintiff, Stein, sought to proceed with the lawsuit "as assignee" of
the bankruptcy debtor, Century on a post-bankruptcy assignment. See id. at 889.
Here, Orlob was the party directly injured by the Jensens' breach and he had already
filed suit before bankruptcy.
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Century at the conclusion of the Chapter XI proceedings. Hence Century could assign
no claim."). Thus, the true holding in Stein was that there was no valid original
assignment from the bankrupt debtor to the individuals seeking to assert an assigned
claim in the litigation.
That a jurisdictional issue of standing is not implicated here is demonstrated by a
more recent Ninth Circuit case explaining Stein. In Pershing Park Villas Homeowners
Association v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 219 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2000), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that claims that had not been listed on bankruptcy
schedules could be pursued by the bankrupt developers where an objection had not
been timely raised. The defendants in that case, relying on Stein, objected to the
developers' standing "on the rule that the bankruptcy estate retains title to prebankruptcy causes of action not disclosed to or abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee."
Id. at 899.9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the idea that there was no
standing to sue in the jurisdictional sense, stating:
There can be no question that these injuries are concrete, traceable to
Reliance's conduct, and remediable by money damages. Nor can there
be any question that these injuries were literally "suffered by" the
developers, see id., though the right to sue on them may have passed to
their bankruptcy estates by operation of the bankruptcy laws. . . . Reliance
claims that lack of title to their claims deprives the developers of

9

The cases of Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890 (9th Cir. BAP 1993),
Stanley v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 B.R. 25 (W.D. Va. 1993), In re Benefield, 102
B.R. 157 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989) and Robinson v. J A. Wiertel Construction, 185
A.D.2d 664, 586 N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div. 1992), cited by the Jensens, all recite this basic
proposition of bankruptcy law. That this is a truism of bankruptcy law does not,
however, transform a real party in interest defense, that arises under that set of facts,
into a jurisdictional "standing to sue" defense, as is described more fully in the Pershing
Park discussion, below. The cases cited by the Jensens do not even address whether
the real-party-in-interest defense is waivable.
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constitutional standing to sue. Yet we have specifically distinguished
between constitutional standing and "third-party" standing to bring a claim
to which another holds title.
Id. at 900. Here, Orlob is a party to the very contract the Jensens breached, as were
the plaintiffs in Pershing Park.
Other language from the Ninth Circuit is also instructive. For example, the Ninth
Circuit quoted the district court ruling:
I think the question [ ] posed by an issue of standing is whether a
party has a substantial [stake in a] controversy to make a justiciable
matter. I think it is clear that the three individual plaintiffs do have a
significant stake in the controversy.
The issue [respecting title to the claim] may be one of the
capacity to sue rather than standing. . . . And I think under all the
circumstances that have been adduced in this trial, the objections
by the defendants to [plaintiffs'] proceeding with this litigation [have]
been waived.
Id. at 900. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then held:
The district court was entitled to conclude that the time and manner
in which Reliance raised the issue of standing was strategic. We
cannot say that the district court clearly erred in excluding any nonjurisdictional issues of standing not designated for trial in the
pretrial order.
Id. at 900. Thus distinguishing between jurisdictional issues of "standing" and
prudential issues of "standing" which, in Pershing Park, the trial court had identified as
"capacity to sue,"10 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held essentially that issues of

10

In an earlier case, the Ninth Circuit had recognized this precise issue as a real
party in interest issue. In United States ex rei Dennie Reed v. C.E. Callahan, 884 F.2d
1180, 1183 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
expressly recognized that the issue of whether a debtor or the debtor's Chapter 7
trustee had the right to sue was a question of real party in interest that was waivable.
Id. (Party waived real party in interest objection that Chapter 7 trustee was the only
(continued...)
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parties are waivable and had been waived. Therefore, the holding of Stein,
distinguished by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pershing Park, does not stand for
the proposition that Orlob may not continue his lawsuit here. Instead, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has made clear that, even though a bankruptcy
estate may hold title to a claim pursued by a party to a contract, that is a defense that is
waivable.
Here, the defense clearly has been waived, as the trial court held. The Jensens
have known about Orlob's bankruptcy filing since before they took his deposition on
March 17, 1994, well over ten years ago. The Jensens' counsel specifically questioned
Orlob about his bankruptcy:
Q. Have you ever filed bankruptcy?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you file bankruptcy?
A. I believe it was May of'92.
R. 1684, Orlob Deposition at 38:11-14. The Jensens' counsel then specifically
questioned about whether this lawsuit was listed on the bankruptcy schedules:
Q. Did you disclose in the statements and schedules that you had
a potential action pending with regard to this case?
A. I don't recall.
R. 1684, Orlob Deposition at 39:22-25. Thus, the Jensens knew about this issue for
more than eight years prior to trial, yet chose not to raise it until after the conclusion of

10

(...continued)
person with right to sue as the real party by failing to raise it in a timely manner.)
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closing arguments following trial,11 and the trial court's ruling adverse to them.
Instead, during that entire eight year period, the Jensens chose to take a
different position, namely, that Orlob in fact had no interest in the combined agreement,
at all. It is only after they have failed in that assertion at trial that they now, for strategic
advantage, attempt to take the position that Orlob cannot pursue the interest that he
has been found to have, based on a failure to list an asset that defendants have known
about, or had the opportunity to know about, for more than eight years. This apparently
strategic decision on the Jensens' part was properly found by the trial court to have
resulted in a waiver for its untimely assertion.
This is particularly true when the Jensens allowed the litigation to proceed,
invoking the time and energies of the trial court, this Court on the first appeal, and now
again, and of Orlob and his counsel in defending against their ultimately unsuccessful
position, only to attempt to change it after seeing that they did not prevail. Moreover,
the Jensens are not arguing that they should pay what they owe to the bankruptcy
trustee, but rather, that they should not have to complete paying for the physicians'
billing service they purchased and continue to operate profitably to this day. Viewed in
that light, there is little equitable appeal to the Jensens' effort to avoid payment.
D.

THIS COURT UNQUESTIONABLY HAS JURISDICTION.

It is unquestionable that David L. Orlob had standing to sue at the time he filed
the initial complaint herein, in January, 1992, prior to the date of his bankruptcy. This

11

Indeed, the trial court invited counsel to add issues for closing argument that
were not on the trial court's suggested issues for closing, yet the Jensens still held off
raising this issue until after the trial court ruled adversely to them. R. 1683, Tr. 40:7-18.
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Court's jurisdiction over the case is determined as of that time. "Standing is determined
at the time suit is filed in the trial court, and subsequent events do not deprive the court
of subject matter jurisdiction." Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control
Board, 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993).12
Orlob was and is an actual party to the Combined Agreement and its breach by
the Jensens injured him. Even if the bankruptcy estate had pursued these claims, the
residual left after payment to creditors and of the expenses of the estate would revert to
Orlob. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (requiring distribution of remaining estate to debtor).
See also 6

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,

fl 726.02[6] n. 43 ("For this reason, the debtor has

standing to participate in litigation that may result in a surplus."). Orlob thus, under all
circumstances, even if the bankruptcy were re-opened, retains a very real interest in the
pursuit of the claim, is injured by the Jensens' non-payment and has standing.
Further, this case is the same as Pershing Park, in which the Ninth Circuit Court

12

Accord Get Set Organization v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 446 Pa.
174, 181, 286 A.2d633, 636 n. 6 (1971) ("[0]nce the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it
exists for all times until the cause is fully and completely determined. . . . As a general
rule, jurisdiction once acquired is not defeated by subsequent events, even though they
are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance."); Cleveland Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 538 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We join the First, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which have all explicitly held that standing is
determined as of the time the complaint is filed."). See also Euclid-Mississippi v.
Western Casualty & Surety Company, Inc., 249 Miss. 547, 554, 163 So.2d 676, 679
(1964) ("Jurisdiction is determined as of the time of filing suit."); Mansurv. Coffin, 54
Me. 314, 317 (1866) ('The jurisdiction is determined by the facts existing at the time
when the action was commenced."); State ex rel. Cowan v. District Court of First
Judicial District, 131 Mont. 502, 508, 312 P.2d 119, 123 (1957) ("Jurisdiction however is
to be determined as of the time the action was commenced. 21 C.J.S. Courts, Section
112, page 171."); Bell v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 198 Wis.2d 347, 362, 541
N.W.2d 824, 830 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]e determine jurisdiction as of the time an action
is commenced. . . .").
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of Appeals found that the contracting parties had standing to sue because they, not the
bankruptcy trustee, had "suffered" the breach, even though the bankruptcy trustee
owned the claim. See 219 F.3d at 900.
E.

THE JENSENS' EFFORT TO RECAST THEIR STRICKEN, UNTIMELY, JUDICIAL
ESTOPPEL DEFENSE DOES NOT AVAIL THEM.

The Jensens argue in the "standing" portion of their Brief, that Orlob engaged in
willful misconduct involving the courts by not listing this lawsuit as an asset. First, there
is no evidence in the record that the omission was willful. The trial court did not make
such a finding and the bankruptcy evidence admitted was not admitted for any such
purpose. Second, however, this confusing portion of the Jensens' Brief is apparently
designed to convince this Court that Orlob should be estopped from pursuing his claim,
which argument is the untimely-raised "judicial estoppel" defense the trial court struck.
The defense of judicial estoppel was waived, and is in any event inapplicable, as
discussed below.
This judicial estoppel defense, like the real party in interest defense, was raised
for the first time, post-trial and, like the real party in interest defense, was stricken by
the trial court as untimely raised.13 Apparently recognizing that they cannot prevail on

13

The Jensens may not call their judicial estoppel defense by its real name in
their brief because they clearly cannot make out a judicial estoppel under Utah law. In
Salt Lake City v. Silverfork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d 1206, the Utah Supreme
Court made clear that, in the Utah courts, judicial estoppel will not be used against a
party where there is no evidence that the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought
knowingly misrepresented any facts in a prior proceeding. See 2000 UT 3 H 33, 5 P.3d
at 1217, n.15 ("The purpose behind judicial estoppel is not served in a case such as
this, where there is no evidence that the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought
knowingly misrepresented any facts in the prior proceeding."). Further, judicial estoppel
will not be applied in Utah "where the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel had
(continued...)
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appeal unless they convince this Court that their defense is jurisdictional, but hoping to
use their argument of "concealment" to smear Orlob nonetheless, the Jensens continue
to assert that Orlob's failure to list them was deliberate.
First, there is no testimony or other evidence introduced at trial to that effect.
The testimony of Orlob was that he had two brief meetings at a bankruptcy mill and
signed the schedules they prepared. R. 1682, Tr. 126:4-14. A review of the schedules,
themselves, which were not admitted for the purpose of showing any "concealment,"
shows that Orlob, in addition to not listing his claim against the Jensens, also did not
list, although he could have obtained a discharge of them if they were listed, the
Jensens' claims against Orlob for breach of contract. This failure by Orlob to list a debt
that could have been discharged suggests that the failure to list the claim, both of which
involved the Jensens, was mere inadvertence. The Jensens were not parties to the
bankruptcy proceeding and were in no way prejudiced by the inadvertent oversight of
Orlob, one that benefitted them because their claim against him was not discharged.

13

(...continued)
equal or better access to the relevant facts." Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough v.
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Utah 1996). It is also required, under Utah law, that the
party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel was a party to the prior proceeding, and that
the party against whom judicial estoppel is invoked must have prevailed upon its
statement against the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel, in the prior proceeding.
See Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996) ("[T]he rule followed in
Utah requires that the party seeking judicial relief must have prevailed upon its
statement in the earlier proceeding: '[A] person may not, to the prejudice of another
person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons
or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position was successfully
maintained.'"). In other words, Utah law requires reliance by the party seeking to invoke
judicial estoppel. See, e.g., Schaerv. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 n.3 (Utah 1983) ("the
absence of any reliance renders the doctrine of judicial estoppel or estoppel by oath
inapplicable to the present case."). No evidence was introduced by the Jensens to
uphold a finding on any of these elements.
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Still, the Jensens cite Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d
414 (3d Cir. 1988), for the proposition that a "duty to disclose" somehow precludes
Orlob from having standing in a jurisdictional sense. In Oneida, however, judicial
estoppel was imposed against a Chapter 11 debtor. The more recent Third Circuit case
of Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996)
points out, in Oneida, the debtor had listed the persons in defendants' position here as
creditors, without any mention of possible offset, and that is why judicial estoppel was
imposed. See Ryan Operations G.P., 81 F.3d at 363 (Oneida judicially estopped
because amount owed to creditor as liability listed, but claim against that creditor for
possible offset omitted).
Oneida pointed out that "the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply 'when
the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a
scheme to mislead the court.'" Id. at 362. Here, as noted, the Jensens' affirmative
claims against Orlob were also inadvertently omitted, although defendants had sent
Orlob a letter threatening to sue him. That is far different from Oneida. There was no
evidence introduced of any willful misconduct on Orlob's part and the trial court entered
no such finding, but instead struck their defense. Below, the Jensens also relied on
Browning Manufacturing v. Mims (In re Coastal Planes, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir.
1999). But even in Browning Manufacturing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that the omission of an asset from bankruptcy schedules must be coupled
with affirmative evidence of bad faith. See id. at 211-12. Judicial estoppel was applied
in Browning Manufacturing because there was affirmative evidence showing both that
Coastal knew of the facts giving rise to its inconsistent position and that Coastal had a
33

motive to conceal its claims. See id. at 212. Here, the Jensens introduced no evidence
of any kind to suggest that Orlob knowingly sought to conceal his claim against them
and this defense was, in any event, properly stricken by the trial court as untimely.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Jensens attempted to argue that the Combined Agreement had been
subject to an oral modification. Although they argue that the "fact that the parties
reached an understanding that payments to [Orlob] would be reduced proportionately is
soundly supported in the record[,]" Opening Brief at 24-25, the fact is that Orlob denied
such a modification in his testimony. R. 1681, Tr. 78:6-19.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 25-5-

4(1 )(a) states:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the
party to be charged with the agreement: (a) every agreement that
by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making
of the agreement. . .."
Id. The Combined Agreement clearly falls within the terms of the statute of frauds,
because it "by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making of the
agreement." Indeed, the Combined Agreement contains a ten-year non-compete
provision14 and defined the "commission period" as commencing "October 1, 1988 and
terminating] July 31,1994." Combined Agreement, at 2-3. "The rule is well settled in
Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent
agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the

14

See Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah
1984) (oral non-compete agreement extending past one year void under statute of
frauds).
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requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v.
Manias, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985). Since the Jensens introduced no written
modification signed by Orlob, and Orlob denied any agreement to modify on the witness
stand, the statute of frauds controlled the trial court's decision, and no enforceable
modification had been proved. As to the testimony to which the Jensens refer, the trial
court, by not making a finding that there was sufficient evidence to take the alleged
modification out of the statute of frauds, and by applying the statute of frauds,
necessarily concluded that the Jensens' proffered evidence was insufficient to convince
the trial court otherwise.
The Jensens point to Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App. 245, 988 P.2d 1, and
contend that it refutes the propriety of the application of the statute of frauds in this
case. The Jensens simply misread Pasquin. In Pasquin, the enforceability of an oral
employment agreement was involved. See id. ffij 3,6,10, 988 P.2d at 2-4. The term of
the alleged oral employment contract was for the employee's "lifetime." See id. This
Court recognized that such term, by its nature indefinite, could be performed within one
year if the employee died. Id. fl 18, 988 P.2d at 6. The Combined Agreement here, in
contrast, by its terms requires payments to extend for a period over one year and
requires performance on a covenant not to compete for ten years. Those terms are not
indefinite and expressly require performance beyond a period of one year. Likewise, in
lion's Service Corp. v. Danielson, 12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982 (1961), relied on by
the Jensens, the term of a contract between a member and a corporation was indefinite
and subject to termination at any time. Id., 12 Utah 2d at 372, 366 P.2d at 984-85.
This is entirely unlike the situation here, where the Combined Agreement expressly
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requires performance to occur over a period that extends beyond one year. Since the
Combined Agreement is within the statute of frauds, so is the alleged modification.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE BREACHES BY ORLOB DID NOT VITIATE THE
JENSENS' PAYMENT OBLIGATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

The Jensens argue that the trial court "made no express factual findings with
respect to whether [Orlob's] breaches of the [Combined Agreement] either were or were
not material." Opening Brief at 28. This ignores the express findings of fact by the trial
court concerning thebreaches. FOF fl 16 expressly discusses Orlob's breach of
warranty to deliver Dr. Hamilton at a 6% commission, and makes a finding as to the
appropriate remedy for that breach, under the circumstances. FOF fl 17 expressly
discusses Doctors Watson and Beatty and their renegotiation of their commission
payment from 6% to 4%, expressly finding that such renegotiation and reduction was
completely unrelated to any breach by Orlob. Finally, the trial court, on finding that
Orlob breached his covenant not to compete with respect to one physician, Dr.
Peterson, found in FOF fl 20, that the Jensens had gone forward with the contract and
elected a remedy to deal with that situation that was fair and appropriate.
The Hamilton and Peterson situations were the only express findings of breach
where there was any finding of adverse economic impact to the Jensens under the
Combined Agreement. In each of those situations, based on the facts, the trial court
imposed an appropriate remedy to compensate the Jensens. The Jensens have failed
to attack the sufficiency of the trial court's findings listed above. They have failed to
make any effort to marshall the evidence in favor of those findings and then attempt to
show that the findings are unsupported by any substantial evidence. Based on that

36

failure alone, this Court should refuse to review the Jensens' third point of appeal, as to
whether they should have been excused from any further payment obligation, because
it must be assumed that substantial evidence supports the findings. See 438 Main
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,^69, 99 P.3d 801, 817.
The Jensens apparently attempt to avoid the marshalling requirement by arguing
that "materiality" is a question of law, not fact. In support of that argument, they cite
three cases, Hermansen v. Tasulas, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, Gohlerv. Wood, 919
P.2d 561 (Utah 1996) and S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974). The
"materiality" discussed in each of these cases is not whether a particular breach of
contract was a material breach of contract, but rather, whether certain facts, either
omitted or misrepresented, were "material" in a fraud context. Each of those cases
supports a conclusion that the "materiality" component of a representation or omission
in a fraud case is essentially objective, and therefore a legal question. This is not a
fraud case.
The controlling law that answers the question of whether a breach of contract is
so material as to justify relieving the non-breaching party of further performance
obligations is Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
In Coalville City, an outdoor sign company contended that the City had breached
its agreement by not purchasing or leasing a sign and that the company therefore was
relieved of its obligation under the agreement to remove its billboards over an eighteen
year period. See id. at 1207-08. The trial court held, based on the facts, that the
breach was not material. This Court cited the following authorities that the
determination of materiality of a breach of contract is a question of fact):
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'The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to a
contract excuses further performance by the non-breaching party."
Holbrookv. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah
App.1994). What constitutes a material breach is a question of
fact. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App.1994) ("Whether a party
has materially breached a lease is generally a question of fact for
the fact finder."), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995 . . ..
Coalville City, 930 P.2d at 1209. This ruling is also supported by the
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

RESTATEMENT

§ 241 (1981), which lists the factual considerations that a

court must look at to resolve the fact question of whether a breach of contract is
material. One consideration expressly listed is whether the injured party could be
adequately compensated, see id. § 241 (b), a consideration that the trial court's findings
resolved by determining adequate compensation to the Jensens. Another express
consideration is the extent to which the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture. See
id. § 241(c). Here, the Jensens argue that they should be relieved of their obligation to
pay for an entire business, due to breaches that are easily remedied as the trial court
did. The Jensens simply argued for a forfeiture that the trial court would not allow.
Thus, substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings and decision. The
Jensens' failure to marshall such evidence, and choice to offer evidence supporting
only their argument, cannot be excused. The trial court heard all the evidence and
ruled based upon substantial evidence.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST.

Again, the Jensens fail to marshall evidence to support the trial court's finding on
pre-judgment interest, as set forth in the exhibit attached to and incorporated in its
findings of fact. R. 1644-49. The calculation of pre-judgment interest in this case is
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pure math.
If there were no claims of offset in this case, interest on each unpaid monthly
commission sums owing under the Combined Agreement would be made by adding
interest to each monthly commission payment as it became due and remained unpaid.
This is a general principle of law, allowing prejudgment interest as a consequential
damage:
Prejudgment interest is allowed on the theory that an injured
party should be fully compensated for his or her loss, and is
appropriate when the underlying recovery is compensatory in
nature and when the amount at issue is easily ascertainable and
one upon which interest can be easily computed.
45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 42 (1999). Utah law is in accord with this standard
for awarding prejudgment interest:
"A prejudgment interest award is proper when the damage is
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the
amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time." Lefavi v. Bertoch,
2000 UT App 5, ^ 2 4 , 994 P.2d 817 (quotations and citations
omitted). "[A] court may only award prejudgment interest if
damages are calculable within a mathematical certainty." Id.

Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App 112, fl 52, 69 P.3d 297, 311. In Harris, like
here, the defendant argued that no prejudgment interest could be awarded because of
its entitlement to offsets. See id., fl 53. This Court rejected that argument, stating that
"Utah appellate courts have recognized that 'offsets should be deducted before interest
is calculated when an interest bearing award arises at the same time as the offsets.'" Id.
(quoting Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 381 (Utah 1996)). The
test is whether Orlob's damages can be calculated with mathematical certainty, a test
that has been defined by the Utah courts:
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For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they
must be ascertained "in accordance with fixed rules of evidence
and known standards of value, which the court or jury must follow
in fixing the amount rather than be guided by their best judgment in
assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future
injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed
standards of value." Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown &
Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Fell
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907)).
Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, fl 24, 994 P.2d 817, 823.15
In this case, each offset is specific to a particular monthly commission payment.
Each monthly commission payment is mathematically certain, and each monthly offset
has been declared by the Court and is mathematically certain. Exhibit "A" to the
proposed findings, R. 1644-49, specifically accounts for the offsets in the fashion
required by the Utah courts, i.e., before the calculation of interest. Any ruling that Orlob
may not have interest that is easily calculable simply give defendants a windfall use of
the money they should have paid, but did not, for over a decade, and would constitute
an unjust enrichment.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE 6% WARRANTY WAS A WARRANTY OF THE
DELIVERED CONTRACTS Is SUPPORTED BY THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMBINED
AGREEMENT AND THE TESTIMONY.

The language of the Combined Agreement states: "Notwithstanding the

15

The Jensens' contention that the assessment of respective interests between
Orlob and PCG would defeat Orlob's right to prejudgment interest also has previously
been rejected by the Utah courts. In Lefavi, the trial court was unable to calculate the
percentage interest of plaintiff in an investment, which had been disputed, until the
parties'entered astipulation. 2000 UT App 5, fflj 9-13, 994 P.2d at 820-21. The Court
of Appeals found that the "damages in this case were complete, the loss was measured
by facts and figures, and the loss was fixed at the time of each sale[,]" id. f[ 27, 994
P.2d at 823, and rejected the argument against prejudgment interest as "unpersuasive."
Id. 1126.
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foregoing, Orlob warrants that all listed [] anesthesiologists accounts must be willing to
pay 6% of total collections for services rendered " The trial court took testimony on the
meaning of this ambiguous provision Orlob testified that each doctor was delivered
under a contract by which the doctor was required to pay 6%, although Hamilton had
sent a letter before Orlob completed his deal with the Jensens, indicating that Hamilton
was unwilling to continue at 6%and threatening to terminate his contract (at a time after
closing with the Jensens)
Steve testified that it was the Jensens' "hope" that the warranty was for the life of
the contract, even though most of the doctors could terminate on 90 days notice R
1682, Tr 54 11-55 14 The trial court took argument on the issue on the second day of
trial R 1682, Tr 133 21-153 11 Following that argument, the trial court entered its
findings of fact on the record R 1682, Tr 153 12-157 8 As part of those findings, the
trial court expressly found "So I find it not credible that the Jensens were to suggest,
first of all, that the meaning of this warranty was that, for the entire course of this
contract that, what Mr Orlob, what Mr Orlob was offering, was that these doctors would
not deviate from six percent and secondly, that he had agreed to go around and
introduce them as new owners of the business and expect that the doctors would stick
with the six percent" R 1682, Tr 155 17-23
The trial court recited an abundance of evidence that supported that finding The
Jensens made no effort to marshall that evidence in attacking the trial court's finding,
incorrectly arguing instead "The Court did not base its ruling on any finding as to the
intention of the parties based upon the Combined Agreement or any other factors in
evidence at trial" Opening Brief at 40 What is most astounding about the Jensens'
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contention in their brief is that they actually quote a snippet from the trial judge's
findings, but ignore everything else the judge said.
Instead of marshalling the evidence that the trial court relied on, they
characterize evidence that they deem favorable to them, characterizations the trial
judge already rejected after hearing the evidence. The fact that the Jensens plow
through facts they consider favorable to them effectively concedes that they are
challenging the trial court's factual finding set forth on the record. The judge considered
all the facts and ruled against the Jensens based on substantial evidence.
The trial court's finding on the record is supported by substantial evidence and
by his finding of a lack of credibility on the part of the Jensens. It should be upheld.
VIII.

THE JENSENS' ARGUMENT ATTACKING THE COURTS' FINDING THAT ORLOB

Is

ENTITLED TO SOME SHARE OF THE COMMISSIONS Is MISPLACED.

The Jensens attack FOF fi fl 23-24, that Orlob is entitled to commission
payments under the Combined Agreement, the Jensens again fail to marshall the
evidence that supports Orlob's entitlement to receive commission payments, including
all of the evidence set forth in Part I, above, on the doctrine of practical construction.
Instead, they focus on the lack of evidence that PCG is entitled to receive, or ever
received a commission payment, and attempt to turn the trial court's dilemma on its
head. There was, indeed, no evidence introduced to show that PCG was entitled to
receive, or ever in fact received, a single commission payment. All of the evidence
showed that Orlob was entitled to receive, and did receive, each commission payment
made and in fact was the recipient of an IRS form 1099 for commission payments.
Since the Jensens made no effort to marshall the evidence that Orlob was in fact
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entitled to receive the commission payments, they cannot argue that the trial court was
in error for awarding damages for commission payments not paid to Orlob. Their effort
to turn the Court's dilemma on its head is not well taken, and Orlob should prevail on
his own point of appeal on this issue.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment should be reversed as to the sum of
damages. This Court should order the amount of judgment to be doubled, based on
Orlob's entitlement to 100% of the commission payments under the Combined
Agreement, and in all other respects, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this 8th day of December, 2004.
PETERS SCOFIELD P R I C E / ^ X

C

A Professional Corporation/

DAVID W. SCOFIELD
Attorneys for David L. Orlob
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The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief and Appellee's Brief were mailed,
postage prepaid, this

day of December, 2004, to the following:

James C. Haskins
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES

357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

David W. Scofield
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APPENDIX 1

l
James C. Haskins (1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2827
Telephone: (801)539-0234
Facsimile: (801)539-5210

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID L ORLOB,

:
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL
MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT,
a Utah general partnership
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually
and as general partner of Wasatch
Medical Management, EARLENE B.
JENSEN, individually and as
general partner of Wasatch
Medical Management, STEVEN
K.JENSEN, individually and
as general partner of Wasatch
Medical Management, and
KEVEN J. JENSEN, individually
and as general partner of
Wasatch Medical Management,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Defendants.

Civil No. 910901061CN
Judge Bohling

The Defendants herein, by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby submit
the following Trial Memorandum.
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from a "Combined Agreement" pursuant to which the
Defendants purchased the assets and equipment of Professionars Control Group, Inc.
("PCG"). It is the Defendants' position that it was the understanding of all parties that
the assets that were the subject of the Combined Agreement were owned primarily by
PCG. The Plaintiffs own deposition confirms this view. See Deposition of David L.
Orlob at 8, 22-26, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
The Plaintiff has taken the position that the right to receive payments under the
Combined Agreement belonged exclusively to him, and not to PCG. Not only is this
position inconsistent with the Plaintiffs own deposition, it also conflicts with the law
governing corporations. The shareholders of corporations do not jointly own the assets
of the corporation; rather, they own only a right to a share of the corporation's
distribution of profits, if any. Thus, Plaintiff, as a named party to the Combined
Agreement, did not jointly own the assets of the corporation. Instead, he was only a
named party to the Combined Agreement because part of that agreement included a
covenant not to compete with the Plaintiff individually. The issues in this case are:
1.

Whether, and to what extent, David L. Orlob has been properly paid for
amounts due to him under the Combined Agreement, as modified by any
Page 2

subsequent arrangements between the parties; and
2.

Whether, assuming the Court finds that additional amounts are now due to
the Plaintiff, the Defendants are entitled to offsets from those amounts
attributable to the Plaintiffs breach of the Combined Agreement in (a)
competing directly with the Defendants' business in violation of the
Combined Agreement; (b) failing to deliver physician billing contracts to
the Defendants at a commission rate of six percent; and (c) failing to
assist with the orderly transfer of the physician accounts from the
Plaintiffs business to the Defendants' business.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In August, 1988, the Plaintiff and the Defendants entered into a Combined
Agreement pursuant to which all of the assets of PCG were sold to the Defendants.
The Defendant entered into a number of covenants and promises in the Agreement, the
most significant of which are as follows:
1.

Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Combined Agreement, Plaintiff Orlob
agreed that "[f]or commissions paid and profits shared Orlob warrants that
he will assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens and assist
Jensens to maintain the accounts over the life of this agreement."

2.

Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Combined Agreement, "Orlob further
agrees and warrants he will not compete directly or indirectly in Utah
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against or adverse to Jensens in the billing and collection business for a
period often years commencing August 1,1988.
Pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Combined Agreement, "Orlob warrants that
all listed anesthesiologists accounts must be willing to pay 6 percent of
total collections for services rendered."
Further, during the negotiations leading up to the Agreement, and
consistent with his obligations under the agreement as set forth above,
Orlob assured the Defendants that all of PCG's clients were satisfied with
PCG's billing services, that they intended to remain clients of PCG, and
that he would notify each one of the clients that Wasatch would be
providing billing services instead of PCG.
From the inception of the Agreement, the Plaintiff not only failed to assist
in the transferring of the accounts, he failed to use his efforts to maintain
those accounts.
Many of the clients had, prior to the execution of the Combined
Agreement, notified PCG and Oriob that they were extremely dissatisfied
with PCG's billing services and that they were terminating PCG's services
and going to have Wasatch render billing services for them for a fee of
four percent of total collections.
Prior to the Agreement's execution, Plaintiff told the clients that Wasatch
Page 4

was a new and inexperienced company that was not charging enough to
stay in business and that if Wasatch was still in business within two years
of September 1988, that Plaintiff would refund the difference between
what PCG had been charging and what Wasatch was going to charge
them.
At best, the Plaintiff only notified two of the clients that Wasatch would be
providing billing services for them.
Indeed, the Plaintiff informed several of the clients that Wasatch had not
taken over PCG's accounts and that PCG had merely hired Jensens as
additional employees of PCG.
The clients became aware that Wasatch was indeed performing their
billing services and demanded that Wasatch charge them a fee lower than
the 6 percent fee agreed upon with PCG.
In September, 1988, Plaintiff solicited the business of Dr. Frank Peterson,
one of the clients listed on Schedule B of the Combined Agreement, and,
on or about April 1,1989 began directly competing against Wasatch by
performing billing services for Dr. Peterson. The Plaintiff initially
undertook to service Dr. Peterson's account by relying on the assistance
of his friend and employee, Tracey Kartsone, who at the time worked
directly for Plaintiff Oriob and under his direction.
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12.

Pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Combined Agreement, "Orlob grants to
Jensens a three-year lease on the present business premises wherein
Jensens shall continue the business operations," and granted the Jensens
an option to purchase the building.

13.

Wasatch fulfilled its lease obligations by making payments directly to the
Plaintiff until 1990, when the Plaintiff defaulted on the loan and Wasatch
was forced to begin making its lease payments directly to the mortgage
company.

14.

On or about September 21,1989, the Plaintiff informed one of the
Defendants' employees, Kathy Chapman, that he and a woman named
Tracey" were moving to Los Angeles, California and were going to begin
performing billing services for Dr. Frank Peterson, one of Wasatch Medical
Management's billing accounts.

15.

When he notified Kathy Chapman of his intention to perform billing
services for Dr. Peterson, the Plaintiff also remarked that "he didn't want to
be around Wastach Medical Management's offices on the following
Monday when Jensens found out that he had taken Dr. Frank Peterson's
account from Wasatch Medical Management.

16.

After relocating to California, Plaintiff Orlob formed a new company in Los
Angeles called Electronic Claims Management. Tracey Kartsone was one
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of his employees and lived with him for a time. Tracey Kartsone did the
billing for Dr. Frank Peterson.
16.

By letter to PCG dated September 12,1988, Dr. Richard Greene
terminated the billing services of PCG.

17.

By letter to Plaintiff Orlob dated September 15,1988, Dr. Douglas Hill
terminated the billing services of PCG.

18.

By letter dated September 26,1988, Dr. Stephen Shuput terminated the
billing services of PCG.

19.

By letter dated November 1,1988, Dr. Donald Decker terminated the
billing services of PCG.

20.

By letter dated November 28,1988, Dr. Craig Jensen terminated the
billing services of PCG.

21.

By letter dated June 2,1989, Dr. Randall Stockham terminated the billing
services of PCG.

22.

Drs. Farley, Shuput, and Hill met with Steve and Keven Jensen to express
their displeasure at how the business transaction occurred and that they
were now having and were continuing to have the billing done at 6 percent
when they knew other people were having their billing done at 4 percent.

23.

Drs. Farley, Shuput and Hill advised Steve Jensen that they were
empowered to represent a number of the physicians covered by the
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Combined Agreement, and advised him that they would be changing
billing services unless some compromise was made.
24.

As of the present date, the Defendants have paid to Plaintiff approximately
$170,000.00 in cash and other benefits under the terms of the Combined
Agreement.

25.

The Plaintiff did not personally own the assets of PCG; rather, those
assets, including the contracts with the various physicians, were owned by
the corporation.

26.

The Plaintiff agreed, explicitly or implicitly, to each and every reduction
made by the Defendants to amounts due him under the Combined
Agreement,

27.

The Plaintiff failed to list any amount allegedly due to him in the

statements and schedules he filed in his bankruptcy proceeding in California.
Consequently, the Plaintiff has in effect admitted that his interest in the
Combined Agreement had no value or minimal value.
ARGUMENT
Simply as a factual matter, the Defendants have complied with all of their
obligations under the Combined Agreement, at least until they purchased the interest of
PCG in that agreement from the IRS. At that point, they ceased making payments to
the Plaintiff. Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that Plaintiff Orlob,
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individually, had some undefined interest in the Combined Agreement and remanded
the case to this Court to determine the nature and amount of that interest. The Court of
Appeals found that Orlob's covenants "require[d] Orlob's individual performance;
performance solely by PCG does not suffice." Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Managment,
33 P.3d 1078,1081 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Consequently, this Court must now
determine the value of Orlob's interest in the agreement.
To begin with, of course, after he filed the instant action, Plaintiff Orlob filed a
petition in bankruptcy with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of
California wherein he did not list his interest on his statements and schedules as an
asset of his bankruptcy estate. Thus, by his own admission, his interest in the
Combined Agreement had little or no value.
Second, Orlob's complete failure to perform any of his obligations under the
agreement absolved the Plaintiffs from any further duty to perform pursuant to its terms.
There is simply no dispute in this case that Orlob failed to honor his express
agreements to (1) not compete with the Defendants in their business; (2) provide for the
orderly transfer of the physician accounts from his own business to the Defendants'
business; and (3) insure that the physicians who transferred their business to the
Defendants were willing to pay a six percent commission for the billing services
performed by the Defendants.
It is well settled that parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith and
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to cooperate in the performance of the contract in accordance with its expressed intent.
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). One who enters into a contract must
cooperate in good faith to carry out the intention of the parties when the contract was
made. Weber Meadow-View Corp. V. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1978). The Plaintiff,
however, immediately commenced to compete with the Defendants in contravention of
the Agreement, by arranging for his own employee to do the billing for Dr. Frank
Peterson. Dr. Peterson was one of the physicians whose billing contract was
transferred to the Defendants.
Additionally, there is not a scintilla of evidence in this case that Plaintiff Orlob
ever did anything at all to assist in the orderly transfers of the physicians accounts to the
Defendants. Indeed, he actively undermined that process by telling physician clients
that the Defendants had not purchased the billing contracts and instead were merely his
own employees. Such conduct cannot be seen as a good faith attempt to meet his
obligations under the contract. A party who is seeking to enforce a contract must prove
performance of his own obligations. Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp,, 883 P.2d 295
(Utah Ct.App. 1994).
A material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by the
non-breaching party. Anderson v. Doms, 984 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct App. 1999). What
constitutes a material breach of a contract is a question of fact. Coalville City v.
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As the facts of this case abundantly
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demonstrate, the Plaintiff Orlob materially breached the Combined Agreement by failing
to perform on any of his commitments pursuant to the contract. Under such
circumstances, the Plaintiff should be deemed entitled to little, if any, additional
compensation under the terms of the Combined Agreement
DATED this Z&

day of June, 2002.

— ~
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4v\«-Air

-Oames C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Trial
Memorandum was served on the 20th day of June, 2002, by hand delivery to the offices
of Plaintiffs counsel as follows:
David Scofield, Esq.
David Burns, Esq.
PARSONS DAVIES KINGHORN & PETERS
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

homas N. ThWnp^bn
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